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Abstract: This paper analyses the behaviour of pharmaceutical companies that 
face the threat of having their drugs excluded from reimbursement and the 
markets characterised also by price caps. We conclude that price elasticity of 
demand and cost differentials cause the price discounts which drug firms offer to 
health care organisations. Additionally, we conclude that price cap regulations 
affect the time path of prices, resulting in higher prices for new products and 
lower prices for old products. 
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Resum: Aquest treball analitza el comportament dels laboratoris farmacèutics 
que s’enfronten a l’amenaça de veure els seus productes exclosos de les 
prestacions farmacèutiques i que operen en mercats en els que existeixen preus 
màxims. El treball conclou que l’elasticitat al preu de la demanda i les 
diferencies de cost fan que els laboratoris ofereixin descomptes a les 
organitzacions que presten els serveis sanitaris. A més, el treball conclou que la 
regulació de preus màxims afecta a la trajectòria dels preus al llarg del temps, en 
forma de majors preus pels productes nous i menors preus pels productes vells. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 There is anecdotal evidence that pharmaceutical companies offer price 
reductions to health care organisations (HCOs) which implement a de-listing 
policy. In the US drug firms offered price reductions on brand name prescription 
medicines only to HCOs. Retail pharmacists seek treble damages in private law 
suits alleging that pharmaceutical firms violated the US antitrust laws with such 
price discrimination policy (Scherer 1997 and related papers in the same issue). 
 Not only Health Mainte ance Organisations (HMOs), but also National 
Health Services (NHSs), and generally speaking private or government 
controlled HCOs usually have de-listing policies. De-listing of drugs by NHSs 
is still an extremely rare event. De-listing had occurred twice in the UK (1985 
and 1998) and in Spain (1993 and 1998). During the two rounds of de-listing 
negotiations, pharmaceutical companies offered the UK and Spanish 
governments price reductions to avoid having their brand name medicines 
excluded. 
 Secondly, companies are also subject to prices controls. While in the 
UK, NHS list prices are set using a sort of rate-of-return regulation, many 
governments, such as the Spanish and the French, control drug prices using 
product by product price cap regulations. In 1993, price cap regulation was even 
a matter of public debate in the US but was discarded in the end (see Abbott III 
1995). As Danzon (1997, 311) states, ‘a government purchaser negotiates on 
behalf of an entire country and hence has significant monopsony power.’1 
                                         
1 As pointed out by one referee, with decreasing average costs due to large drug R&D sunk 
costs, monopsony power drives drug prices down, even near constant marginal cost, but also 
increases the quantity of drugs consumed and pharmaceutical expenditures when risk bearing 
mechanisms are not introduced at the health care provider level. 
2 
 Therefore, pharmaceutical companies are subject to two mechanisms 
which may cause price differentials across sectors and countries. HCOs 
determine  the medicines that are included in formulary and the conditions under 
which the drugs may be de-listed. And both governmental and private 
purchasers control pharmaceutical expenditures using price setting mechanisms. 
 This paper tries to explain drug price differentials caused by de-listing
and price cap policies. We will show how these policies may affect price trends 
over time. Our starting point is that markets for drugs may be viewed as 
monopolistically competitive. According to Danzon (1997, 303), ‘aggressive 
competitive entry of differentiated therapeutic substitutes implies that the 
industry is best characterised as monopolistically competitive, with possible 
pockets of oligopoly early in the life of a nw therapeutic class’. Thus, products 
within a therapeutically defined market are differentiated, and average cost of 
each variety can be seen as decreasing with respect to the quantity produced. 
 This follows if we assume that producers face an ex ante known fix d 
cost for developing and granting market approval of a new medicine (research, 
development and authorisation costs) while the production of medicines exhibits 
constant returns to scale. Within this setting, Nash equilibrium prices on a 
therapeutic market result from the inverse elasticity rule, and entry occurs until 
profits of new entrants are zero or negative ex ante. 
 Although the break-even condition is hardly compatible with patent 
protection, this assumption conforms to models of endogenous in ovation and 
rent dissipation in which firms obtain zero profits in the long-run  steady-state 
equilibrium like in Grossman and Helpman (1996 and 1994) and Helpman 
(1993). 
 Our analysis of the impact of the de-listing policy on drug prices is 
closely related to Zweifel and Crivelli (1996) and Zweifel and Breyer (1997, 
320-325). These authors have considered the effects of the risk of a reference 
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price being imposed by the government on prices in a otherwise non regulated 
market. We analyse equilibrium prices when  suppliers face the risk of having 
their products de-listed. Contrary to those authors, however, we assume demand 
for each variety to be price elastic, according to the monopolistically 
competitive frameworks which may be more realistic in countries such as the 
US and the UK. Our results are fully consistent with those obtained by Zweifel 
and Crivelli (1996) and Zweifel and Breyer (1997, 320-325). Equilibrium prices 
are lower when reference pricing or de-listing risks are introduced either in a 
model with price elastic demand and with perfectly price inelastic demand.   
 Our model supports the line of reasoning of Elzinga and Mills (1997) 
and Danzon (1997) that price reductions offered to major US HCOs did not 
violate antitrust laws. Rather, they saw an increased price elasticity of demand 
which they related to doctors whose prescribing habits were not approved by the 
HCO being penalised. 
 We also show how the threat of de-listing and price caps modify the 
development of prices over time. According to Abbo t III (1995), 
pharmaceutical firms in a deregulated market, such as that of the US, increase 
prices over time. Therefore, if a price cap is imposed at the beginning of the life 
cycle of a new drug, firms would react by charging a higher introductory price, 
fearing that government will disallow future increases in excess of consumer 
price index. We study this type of strategic price dynamics in the case of 
monopolistically competitive markets with majors purchasers having a de-li ting 
policy. 
 In the next section, we move on to model the decisions of patients, 
doctors, purchasers and pharmaceutical companies. We also introduce de-listi g 
policy and price caps. In section 3, the paper turns to present calculations in 
order to predict the price reductions wh ch would have been offered to the NHS 
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in the UK and the price dynamics if a price cap is set. We conclude with some 
remarks about price differentials observed in the markets for pharmaceuticals. 
 
2. The model 
 
We will use superscript i for denoting price and quantity (qij, p
i
j) consumed if 
product j is included in a purchaser’s formulary. On the other hand, we will use 
superscript e to denote the case where drug j is excluded from the formulary (qj
e
, 
pj
e). 
 
2.1 Demand equation in the case of exclusion from reimbursement 
 
 Let us firstly focus on the case of the demand equation when a drug is 
not reimbursed by the HCO. We assume that it is the patient who decides which 
medicine to consume and how much of it to consume. Altho gh patients usually 
seek medical advice and may even have to ask for a prescription, we assume that 
they make the final decisions, taking into account the doctor advise and their 
income constraint since they will end up paying fully for the drug.
 Following the symmetric monopolistically competitive models 
developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Spence (1976), the utility function of 
the representative patient can be thought of as having two arguments. A sub-
function whose value depends on the quan ities of j consumed (qj
e) for a given 
condition (like for instance analgesics) containing j differentiated product types 
and the numéraire good (q0e) that does not exhibit product differentiation. Price 
for numeraire is assumed to be one, p0=1. 
 The utilty sub-function of the differentiated drugs has constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES). The CES form requires that price elasticity of demand for 
each variety to be unaffected by new product entries, and hence, price-cost 
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margins to be positive and indepe ent of the number of varieties in the market. 
However, if entry causes price elasticities of demand for existing varieties to 
increase and entry is costless, prices converge to marginal cost when the number 
of varieties in the market increases. In thi latter case, varieties become 
increasingly closer substitutes as entry occurs. By contrast, in this paper, we will 
assume that price elasticity of demand for each variety in the market is constant 
with respect to the number of varieties in the market. So doing, we will focus 
our attention on the effect of de-listing policy on prices rather on the discussion 
about how entry impacts on the price-cost margin. 
 The patient‘s decision in the case of an excluded drug is to maximise her 
utility subject to the income constraint, where I is income in terms of a 
numéraire. 
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 For concavity, the elasticity of substitution must be less than unity (re 
<1), and since we want quantities consumed to be positive or zero, the elasticity 
of substitution must be greater than zero (re > 0). 
 Optimisation accounts to a two-stage budgeting procedure in this case. In 
the first stage, patients decide the quantity of the numérair (q0
e), and the total 
quantity of differentiated pharmaceuticals (Qe), depending on patient income 
(see eq. 3) and on the aggregate price index of pharmaceuticals (Pe), 
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 where Pe and Qe are dual price and quantity indices of the differentiated 
pharmaceuticals in the therapeutic category considered (see eq. 4) and se-0(P
e) is 
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the function which shows the percentage of income being spent in 
pharmaceuticals depending on the price index. 
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 In the second stage, the patient decides how much she spends on each of 
the pharmaceuticals. The demand for a variety j is giv n by, 
hh --= )()( ej
iee
j pPQq ,     (5) 
 with h > 0 denoting the absolute value of the constant common price 
elasticity of demand. As long as the number of differentiated drugs in a given 
therapeutic category is reasonably large, we may neglect the eff ct of each pj
e on 
the price index Pe and on the quantity index Qe. In this case, the price elasticity 
h is,      
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 If the elasticity of substitution between product types tends to one (re ® 
1), the  j product types are perfect substitutes. Accordingly, price elasticity of 
demand tends to infinity (h® ¥). By contrast, if the  elasticity of substitution 
tends to zero (re ® 0), product types are perfectly different ated, and price 
elasticity of demand tends to unity (h® 1). In the terminology of Chamberlain, 
this is the elasticity of the variety-specific dd curve which relates the demand for 
an individual variety to its own price, with all other prices held constant. 
 
2.2 Demand for a reimbursed drug 
 
 Let us now turn to the case where the drug is reimbursed. In this case, we 
assume that doctors act as perfect agents of their patients in deciding which drug 
to consume and how much to consume. We also assume that doctors act as 
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agents of their HCOs in respecting the budget constraint in the treatment of a 
patient. 
 We also assume that patients, as it is the case in the UK, either pay a 
fixed prescription charge or are exempt of any copayment. Therefore, the 
prescription charge is not related to the price of a drug; while reducing the 
welfare of patients, it does not affect the price elasticity of demand. 
 The doctor’s decision problem is to maximise patient welfar  subject to 
budget constraint imposed by the HCO, where B is the budget available per 
representative patient, 
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 Following the same two-stage budgeting procedure as above, doctors 
first decide on behalf of their patients the quantity of numéraire (q0
i), and the 
total quantity consumed in the market for differentiated medicines (Qi), 
depending on the budget (B) and on the aggregate price index of the covered 
drugs in the therapeutic category considered (Pi), 
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 where Pi and Qi are dual price and quantity indices of the differentiated 
drugs, 
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 In the second stage, the doctor decides how much to spend on each one 
of the differentiated j drugs within the relevant category. Demand for a variety is 
given by, 
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 Here d>0 denotes the increase in the price elasticity h due to the fact that 
a variety is included in the formulary. It may be seen as reflecting the ffects of 
increased price transparency within the HCO and of the monitoring of 
prescribing habits by the HCO.
 As long as the number of differentiated drugs in a therapeutic category is 
reasonably large, we may neglect the effect of each pj
i nPi and on Qi. Total 
price elasticity of demand then amounts to, 
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 where  h >1 and d ³0.  (12) 
 Therefore, demand for drugs included in the formulary is more price 
elastic than demand for varieties that excluded.
 
2.3 De-listing policy of the HCO 
 
The way we model de-listing policy conforms to Zweifel and Crivelli (1996, 
260), who model the effect of the risk faced by pharmaceutical firms of being 
constrained by a future reference price. We define by aj  (0 < aj < 1) the 
probability of a variety being de-listed. This depends on pj
i with a common 
elasticity e >0, i.e. on the price charged for the variety. Moreover, aj depends on 
a parameter (E >0) not related to price, such as the effectiveness of the drug: 
ea --= )(1 ijj pE  where   >0.    (13) 
 This function is a way of expressing in a simple way a de-listing policy 
which would result from minimising pharmaceutical expenditure subject to the 
constraint of securing a given level of expected utility to the representative 
patient. The listing policy price sensibility (e) thus measures the percentage 
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change of the probability of retaining a drug in the formulary when price 
increases 1 percent: 
i
j
j
pln
)1ln(
¶
-¶
-=
a
e >0     (14) 
 
2.4 Pricing equation 
 
 In this section, we derive price discounts offered by pharmaceutical 
companies to HCOs. We assume that the HCO only decides whether or not she 
includes a drug in the formulary. When a drug is included, the price proposed by 
the supplier becomes the list price of the product, whereas once a drug is de-
listed, its price is unconstrained. 
 For simplicity, let each variety be produced by a different firm. Denote c 
for the common constant marginal cost of production of a drug. However, firms 
face a fixed cost of entry denoted by F which depends on whether or not the 
product is included (Fi and Fe >0). 
 For modelling entry decisions, Mas Colell, Whinston and Green (1995) 
suggest a two-stage approach. First, firms decide whether or not they pay the 
fixed entry cost to enter into the market, engage in research and development 
and marketing of a drug. In the second stage, firms in the market compete for 
consumers, entry cost being sunk. 
 Using this perspective the expected profits for each product j are E(pj) is 
given by, 
i
j
i
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e
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 Firms maximise expected profits obtained from having her products 
whether excluded or included in a HCO formulary without taking into account 
fixed costs. The FOC with respect to de-listing price is given by, 
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Simplifying, one obtains the equilibrium price, which in the case of de-
listing contains the conventional mark-up over marginal cost, 
cpej 1-
=
h
h .      (17) 
 The FOC with respect to listing prices is the following: 
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 From (18) multiplied in both sides using (21) and using the free entry 
break-even expressions (19) and (20), we obtain the list price given by (22): 
 iijtij Fqcp =- )( ,      (19) 
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 Since we may assume that the fixed cost in the case of listing (Fi) is
smaller than fixed cost in case of de-listing (Fe) we write that Fe = f · F
i  where f 
>1. This assumption tries to reflect that mainly marketing fixed costs are larger 
when a product is de-list d, while the amount of research costs are the same in 
case of listing and in case of de-listing. 
 
Equilibrium list price is given by, 
c
f
f
pij 1)1(
)1(
--++
-++
=
edh
edh .     (23) 
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 The SOC implies that the following restriction must be satisfied for the 
equilibrium being one of maximum profit, edheeedh )()1)(( +>÷
÷
ø
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è
æ
++++ cp
q
c
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. 
 According to our assumptions, ( ) 0)1( >-+=D ed f is strictly positive and 
therefore the mark-up over marginal cost of list prices shown in (23) is smaller 
than the mark-up over marginal cost of de-listing prices shown in (17), 
1-h
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 This is the case when one or both of our following assumptions are met: 
(1) de-listing policy is price elastic (e > 0) and, at the same time, fixed costs of 
entry are smaller in the case of reimbursement than otherwise (f >1); (2) when 
demand in case of being included in the HCO formulary is more price elastic 
than demand in case of de-listing from the formulary (d >0). 
 This result supports the evidence cited by Elzinga and Mills (1997) and 
Danzon (1997) that when drug firms compete monopolistically within a 
therapeutic category, they offer discounts to avoid having their products 
excluded from HCOs formularies. 
 
 
2.5 Price cap constraint 
 
 In many countries, like France or Spain, prices of all drugs in the market 
are also subject to caps while in others, such as the US, there has been debate 
about limiting the increase of pharmaceutical prices. When prices are subject to 
cap constraints, firms have to set introductory prices according to expected
parameters values throughout the product life. 
 For taking into account the cap constraints we move on to a dynamic 
analysis (i.e, considering the product life t=0,1,2,...,T). We discount the firm 
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profits flow during the product life and we includ  the price cap regulation 
constraint. 
 Price cap regulation allows prices to rise with the rate of inflation less a 
fixed percentage called the “X factor”. We assume that our price cap regulation 
“X factor” equals the inflation rate. Introductory price become the price cap 
during the life of each product type. We use the Abbott III (1995) assumption 
that firms know parameters values with certainty. Firms maximise the profit 
flow under de-listing policy and price cap regulation constraint as given by, 
þ
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 We may obtain the FOC as before. Equilibrium list price depend on the 
parameter values which appear in the following expression across the product 
type life: 
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 for all  t =1, ..., T.  (26) 
 
 The price cap is binding only when one of the following conditions is 
satisfied: (1) when de-listing policy price elasticity (et) is decreasing over time; 
(2) when demand price elasticity (ht+dt ) is decreasing over time; (3) when 
marginal (ct) or fixed costs (Ft
i) are increasing over time. Any of those 
conditions implies that prices not subject to a price cap regulation tend to 
increase over time. In all those cases, the problem is just to select a launch pri e 
(pj
i=pjt
i for t=0,1,2,..., T). 
 By contrary, when de-listing policy price elasticity (et) or demand price 
elasticity (ht+dt ) increase over time, or when marginal (ct) or fixed costs (Fti) 
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are decreasing over time prices would suffer a decreasing trend and therefore the 
price cap constraint is not binding. Firms would propose price reductions over 
time according to the equations outlined in the previous s ction. 
 Therefore, price reductions to major HCOs or price differentials across 
countries are heavily dependent on the expected values of demand price 
elasticity, de-listing policy price elasticity, and cost across time within each 
country. 
 
3. Examples 
 
3.1 Example of price discounts caused by de-listing policy 
 
 We are going to show price reductions which would have been offered 
by drug firms to the NHS in the UK when marketing medicines within a 
hypothetical therapeutic market if those firms would have been subjected to a 
different types of de-listing policy constraints. 
 Equilibrium price under de-listing policy constraint may be calculated 
using the equation given by (23) and a set of parameter values. The parameters 
values have been chosen for satisfying our model restrictions and also for 
offering list prices equal to the median price of reimbursed medicines by the 
NHS and dispensed in England in 1996 which was £8.33 (See Borrell 2001). 
 We assume that common marginal cost equal  to £6.52 (c=6.52). We 
also assume that the price elasticity of dd demand curve is equal to 3 (h=3), that 
the additional price elasticity of demand elasticity due to HCO prescription 
controls is equal to 1 (d =1), and that the price elasticity of listing policy is equal 
to 4 (e = 4). We also assume that fixed cost in case of de-listing is 15% larger 
than fixed cost in case of inclusion in the formulary (f=1.15). 
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Table 1 shows three equilibria: first, de-li ting equilibrium; second, 
equilibrium when listing policy is perfectly price inelastic (e = 0); and third, 
equilibrium when de-listing policy is price elastic (e = 4). 
 
Table 1 
Example of drug price discount 
 e Price (£) 
Discount from de-list 
price 
De-listing - p
e
j = 9.78 - 
Non price depended de-
listing policy 0.00 p
i
j = 8.69 11.14 % 
Price depended de-listing 
policy 4.00 p
i
j = 8.33 14.83 % 
Source: Author’s calculations using the parameters c=6.52, f=1.15, h=3 
and d =1. 
 
When de-listing policy is perfectly price inelastic (e = 0), firms would set 
list price equal to £8.69, that is 11.14 % below the price which would like to set 
firms in case of de-listing, £9.78. When listing policy is prices elastic (e= 4),  
table 1 shows that firms would be kind to offer a 14.83 % discount on de-list
prices. 
 Table 2 shows the results from equilibrium list price calculations. 
Results from the outlined case (h+d= 4 and e= 4) are compared to those cases 
with a larger demand elasticity (h+d =5) and with a smaller demand elasticity 
(h+d =3). Base case results are also compared with those cases with a larger 
price elasticity of de-listing policy (e = 3) and those cases with a smaller price 
elasticity of de-listing policy (e = 5). 
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 Table 2 
Examples of list prices (pij) when firms have a risk aj 
of having their products de-li ted from the formulary (£) 
  
Lager 
differentiation 
(smaller 
elasticity) 
Benchmark 
Smaller 
differentiation 
(larger elasticity) 
  h+d =3.00 h+d =4.00 h+d =5.00 
Smaller de-listing 
elasticity e =3.00 p
i
j= 9.18 p
i
j= 8.41 p
i
j= 7.99 
Benchmark e =4.00 pij= 9.03 pij= 8.33 p
i
j= 7.94 
Larger de- listing 
elasticity e =5.00 p
i
j= 8.89 p
i
j= 8.26 p
i
j= 7.89 
Price in case of de-listing 
(d =1) 
pej= 13.04 p
e
j= 9.78 p
e
j= 8.69 
Source: Author’s calculations using parameter c=6.52 and f=1.15. 
 
 
Table 3 
Examples of list prices (pij) when firms have a risk aj 
of having their products de-li ted from formulary (£) 
  
Lager 
differentiation 
(smaller 
elasticity) 
Benchmark 
Smaller 
differentiation 
(larger elasticity) 
  h+d = 3.00 h+d = 4.00 h+d = 5.00 
Smaller de-
listing elasticity e = 3.00 p
i
j=9.55 p
i
j= 8.59 p
i
j= 8.09 
Benchmark e = 4.00 pij= 9.48 pij= 8.56 p
i
j= 8.07 
Larger de-listing 
elasticity e = 5.00 p
i
j= 9.42 p
i
j= 8.53 p
i
j= 8.05 
Price in case of de-listing 
(d =1) 
pej= 13.04 p
e
j= 9.78 p
e
j= 8.69 
Source: Author’s calculations using parameter c=6.52 and f=1.05. 
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 List prices are smaller when demand elasticity is larger and that list 
prices are smaller when the price elasticity of de-listing policy is larger. Table 3 
shows the same type of examples when fixed costs in case of de-listing are only 
5 percent larger than fixed costs in case of including drugs in the formulary 
(f=1.05). 
 When the lag between fixed costs in case of listing and de-listing is 
smaller, drug firms offer smaller price discounts on de-lis  prices. When f equals 
1.05 list price in our benchmark case is £8.56, that is only 12.47 % discount in 
front of the 14.83 % discount on de-list price offered in the benchmark case 
when f equalled 1.15. 
 
3.2 Examples of price differentials under reimbursing and cap constraints 
 
 Let us show equilibriums when drug firms are not only constraint by de-
listing policy but also by a price cap set by a national price regulator or a major 
HCO when a drug is launched into the market. In this example, we use the 
following parameters: (1)  following to Abbott III (1995) we have considered 
that the product life is 14 years  (column 1, table 4); (2) common marginal cost 
is £6.52 across time (ct=6.52 for t=0,1,...,13) and fixed costs in case of de-listing 
are 15 percent larger than in case of being included in the formulary (fjt=1.15 for 
t=0,1,...,13); (3) common price elasticity of demand is constant across time and 
equals the elasticity of the outlined benchmark case (h=3 and =1); (4) the 
price elasticity of de-listing policy (et) is initially set equal to 5.47 (et = 5.47) and 
decreases across time at a 5 percent rate each year as it is shown in column 2 of 
table 4 (the expected value of et during the 14 year time period is equal to 4 as in 
the outlined benchmark case).
 According to the equation given by (26) we find that firms would like to 
increase list prices (pij) across time from £8.16 to £8.36 as column 4 of table 4 
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shows. However, list prices are always smaller than de-list prices would be 
(pejt= 9.78 for t=0,1,...,13). 
 When drug firms are also constrained by a price cap, prices cannot be 
increased during the product life, and therefore assuming  3 percent discount 
rate (as column 5 in table 4 shows), firms would set a higher introductory list 
price, that is equal to £8.34 in our example as it is shown in column 6 of table 4. 
  
Table 4 
Examples of equilibrium prices when de-listing policy elasticity is decreasing 
(et  decreasing over  t) and prices are cap constrained 
  De-list price List prices List price under a cap
t et P
e
jt p
i
jt b t pijt 
0 5.470 9.78 8.16 1.00 8.34 
1 5.197 9.78 8.18 0.97 8.34 
2 4.937 9.78 8.20 0.94 8.34 
3 4.690 9.78 8.22 0.91 8.34 
4 4.455 9.78 8.23 0.89 8.34 
5 4.233 9.78 8.25 0.86 8.34 
6 4.021 9.78 8.27 0.83 8.34 
7 3.820 9.78 8.28 0.81 8.34 
8 3.629 9.78 8.30 0.78 8.34 
9 3.447 9.78 8.31 0.76 8.34 
10 3.275 9.78 8.32 0.74 8.34 
11 3.111 9.78 8.34 0.72 8.34 
12 2.956 9.78 8.35 0.69 8.34 
13 2.808 9.78 8.36 0.67 8.34 
Source: Author’s calculations using parameter c=6.52, f=1.15, h=3, d = 1 
and E(et)=4. 
 
 When prices are sticky at the launch level, drug firms set list 
introductory price (£8.34) higher than the list introductory price which would be 
in equilibrium without price cap constraint (£8.16). However, when time goes 
by, list prices sticky at the launch level become smaller than those list prices 
which would have been set without the cap. For instance, at t=13 the price in 
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case of price cap regulation remains at £8.34 while prices would reach £8.36 
otherwise. 
 Therefore, drug firms constrained by price cap would initially offer 
smaller price discounts to major HCOs for having their dru s inclu ed in the 
formulary. In our calculation, drug firm would offer only a 14.72 % discount 
(list price of £8.34 instead of de-list price of £9.78) rather than a 16.56 % 
discount which would have been offered without price cap constraint (list price 
of £8.16 instead of de-list price of £9.78). 
 These results are similar to that obtained by Abbott III (1995). In our 
model the force behind the increasing pattern of list prices when firms are not 
constrained by a price cap derives from the decreasing trend of the price 
elasticity of listing policy across time rather than from the decreasing trend on 
the price elasticity of demand over time as it is the case in Abbott III (1995). 
This author assumes that patients were less price elastic as each drug got older 
due to therapeutic and brand loyalty.
 By contrary, we are assuming that HCOs find increasingly difficult to 
exclude older therapeutic categories of drugs. We model some sort of 
therapeutic loyalty building up across time which affect the decision of HCOs. 
Older therapeutic categories of drugs are priced below they would have been 
priced otherwise, while newer therapeutic categories of drugs are priced above 
they would have been priced otherwise. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
We have studied why drug firms offer dif erent prices due to reimbursing and 
price cap policies. Our model show that price reductions offered by 
pharmaceutical companies to major purchasers may have one or both of the 
following two causes: firstly, demand may become more price elastic once a
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drug is included in the formulary; secondly, price reductions may also reflect the 
fact that costs are lower for products that are included in the formulary while, at 
the same time, the HCO de-listing policy is price-sensitive. 
 These results conform to the anecdotal evidence described and analysed 
by Elzinga and Mills (1997) and Danzon (1997) on the price discounts offered 
by drug firms to HCOs in the US. Drug firms offer price discounts when 
reimbursement implies a larger price elasticity of demand and, therefore, they do 
not violate antitrust laws. 
 Additionally, these results capture the key that the monopolistically 
competitive nature of medicine markets may explain price reductions. Drug 
firms offer price reductions when they face smaller fixed costs of prescription 
promotion in case of having a drug included in the formulary. 
 The results of this paper capture also the anecdotal evidence on price 
reductions offered by drug firms when the British or the Spanish governments 
announced that they were going to exclude medicines from the state-l d HCO 
formulary. De-listings affected a smaller number of products than that 
announced due to price reductions not only in Great Britain but also in Spain. 
Drug firms offered price discounts on those drugs which were going to be de-
listed, and like in Spain in 1998, some drug firms avoided having their products 
effectively de-listed.2 
 Finally, we have found the threat of de-listing and price caps modify the 
development of prices over time. Pharmaceutical firms would like to increase 
prices when the price elasticity of de-listing policy decreases over time. Drug 
firms would react by charging a higher launch price when the government 
                                         
2 As noted by one referee, may be political claims on how de-listing might impact on some 
firms profits might have also played a role on h w many drugs were effectively de-listed in 
Spain in 1998. In our model, this producer bias might have affected the perception of the 
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disallow future increases of prices in excess of consumer price index. This is the 
case in Spain where price caps mainly affect the time path of prices, resulting in 
higher prices fornew products but lower prices for old products. 
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